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A judge–advisor system (JAS) is a type of advice structure often studied in advice taking research, a subset of decision-making in the social sciences. The two roles in a JAS are the judge and advisor roles. The judge is the decision maker who evaluates information concerning a particular decision and makes the final judgment on the decision outcome. The advisor is an individual who provides advice, information, or suggestions to the judge.〔Sniezek, J. A. & Buckley, T. (1995). Cueing and cognitive conflict in judge–advisor decision making. ''Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62,'' 159–174.〕 A key component of the dynamics in a JAS is the differentiation between the two roles in that while the advisor provides input to the decision, actual decision-making power resides solely with the judge. This one person decision power differentiates the JAS and related models such as Hollenbeck's Hierarchical Decision-Making Team model〔Hollenbeck, J.R, Ilgen, D.R, Sego, D.J, Hedlund, J, Major, D.A, & Phillips, J. (1995). Multilevel theory of team decision making: Decision performance in teams incorporating distributed expertise. ''Journal of Applied Psychology, 80,'' 292-316.〕 from more widely studied models where the final decision is mutually decided upon by the team as a whole. While JASs can be most easily thought of as between superiors and subordinates (such as in student–advisor or worker–manager relationships), differential social or power standings are not necessary. All that is required is that only one individual (the judge) has the final say in the decision outcome; all other input given to the judge may be taken under consideration but need not be acted on. Therefore, even a situation where a friend receives advice from a peer can be considered a JAS. Though examples of JASs are prevalent in real world settings, they are studied most frequently in laboratory experiments in which judge/advisor roles are randomly assigned and situations/variables are manipulated at a between-subjects level.〔Bonaccio, S. & Dalal, R. S. (2006). Advice taking and decision-making: An integrative literature review, and implications for the organizational sciences. ''Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101,'' 127–151.〕 Such manipulations allow for systematic study of the factors that affect how a judge reacts and responds to advisor advice. ==Advice utilization== Advice utilization is the degree to which judges take advisor advice into consideration in their final decision outcome, and advice discounting is any effect that lowers the degree of advice utilization. Both of these terms are frequently used interchangeably in JAS literature, as they are related in opposition to one another (i.e., advice discounting is a lack of advice utilization). The amount of utilization is one of the most considered outcomes of a JAS decision process, and depends on all the types of inputs described below. In addition to these inputs, there are theories for other sources of advice discounting in decision-making literature; three of the most dominant theories are differential information, anchoring, and egocentric bias.〔 The differential information theory proposes that advice discounting stems from the fact that, unlike with people’s own opinions, they are not aware of advisors’ internal reasons for their opinions and so are less apt to fully accept them.〔Yaniv, I. (2004a). Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit. ''Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 93,'' 1–13.〕〔Yaniv, I. & Kleinberger, E. (2000). Advice taking in decision making: Egocentric discounting and reputation formation. ''Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83,'' 260–281.〕 The second theory, anchoring, suggests that people use their own opinion as the starting point for their choice, and only use advisor input to a certain extent that will adjust their initial position up or down.〔Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty:heuristics and biases. ''Science, 185'', 1124–1131.〕 The third theory, egocentric bias, proposes advice discounting happens due to judges believing they are superior to others, so weigh their own opinion stronger than inputs from any other source.〔Krueger, J. L. (2003). Return of the ego—self-referent information as a filter for social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003). ''Psychological Review'', 110, 585–590.〕 In JAS literature, one of the most robust advice discounting classification is egocentric advice discounting,〔 which draws conceptually from the basic theories of anchoring and egocentric bias. Simply put, egocentric advice discounting is the tendency of individuals to prefer advice and opinions that closely align to their own opinions formed prior to hearing any input. Therefore, judges tend to overly weigh advice from advisors that is similar to their own viewpoint regardless of what sort of expertise an advisor appears to have. Conversely, if the advice given is very dissimilar to the judge’s initial opinions, that advice will be discounted much more than should be justified given the advisor’s level of expertise.〔〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Judge–advisor system」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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